aldric de ocampo,
Opinion: On the Elections (Part 2): Electoral Systems
Note: The first part of this article talked about how uncontested elections serve as an issue in the democratic system of UPIS. This article, on the other hand, will talk about another possible issue in the elections which may also be addressed by the community, assuming a contested case is now apparent for a student-leader position.
To recall, the first part of this article stated that uncontested elections are cases wherein candidates do not have an opponent also running for the same position. It has also been mentioned that this has been a chronic issue for the elections in UPIS, since not having any competition in the elections leads to a weak inauguration and expression of a democratic system in in the institution. However, does having competition in the elections automatically mean that the problem is solved?
This is not exactly the case, as the electoral system of UPIS may also use some changes in its structure to further the purpose of accurately expressing the interests of the students in the school’s democratic system.
To better understand electoral systems, discussing Voting theory may help identify important concepts that contribute to the way elections are studied and handled. Voting theory is a study that falls under the area of Social Choice theory which deals with the process of consolidating varied and conflicting choices into a single group or societal choice that reflects the desires of each individual as much as possible. Even further into this, the concept of voting methods refers to that of the mathematical process, algorithm, or manner in which individual votes are counted and consolidated to produce a winner.
Now what are the different voting methods? Is there an ideal one?
Voting theory includes multiple voting methods that can be applied in the electoral system of a nation or an organization. The most famous one is the plurality method, or pataasan in Filipino. It is the method where the candidate with the most number of votes, or first place votes, wins. Straightforward, simple, and reasonable right?
Plurality systems and its variations are the most used in elections since it is very intuitive and easy. A similar system to and sometimes used in conjunction with this is called the majoritarian system. Here, winners are only declared if they have garnered a majority of the votes (50% + 1) in the elections.
The UPIS electoral system is a good example of a mix between these two methods. It is shown in the COMELEC rules that an election with competing candidates will follow a plurality method, wherein the candidate with the most votes wins. Also, as mentioned in the first part of this article, uncontested election cases will follow that a candidate may still appeal for the position they are running for if they have the majority vote. Although for UPIS, there is a quota or electoral threshold set at 67%, or two-thirds of the votes, for the initial elections. This means uncontested candidates must meet this quota to win, or else they will have to resort to the appeal option to get their desired position.
Also, another voting method, which is relevant to uncontested elections aside from contested ones, is referred to as the approval method. Here, voters can give their approval to the candidate/s during the elections by answering a “yes or no” choice or something similar. Like the plurality method, the candidate with the most approval vote wins. This method is said to work better for smaller voting populations, like some legislatures or organizations.
UPIS uses a variation of the approval method through the options given in the ballots during the elections. The “yes” choice is assigned to the name of the candidate while the “no” choice is assigned to the “abstain” option during uncontested election cases. Though as mentioned, winners in these cases are determined through the minimum electoral threshold.
It can be seen through Voting theory that the voting methods used in UPIS are valid and functional. However, the question remaining is that are these methods fair?
Take a ranked or preferential method sample directly adapted from “Mathematics in the Social Sciences,” a module in the Math 10 course of UP Manila for an example:
In a certain barangay, 100 residents elected their barangay leader. There were 5 candidates: R, H, C, O, and S. The voters were asked to rank the candidates and the individual votes were consolidated. The consolidated results are displayed in the table below called a preference schedule.
Using plurality, the winner is candidate R with 49 1st-place votes, despite being the last choice of a majority (51). Observe that candidate H almost won (falling behind candidate R by just one 1st-place vote). Candidate H is also the second choice of the rest. Might not H be a more acceptable winner? Under any reasonable interpretation, H appears to be more representative of the barangay’s choice. But the plurality method failed to choose H.
We can evaluate candidate H’s performance through a one-to-one comparison with all other candidates. To do this we simply compare votes of H along with all other candidates one at a time. Observe that in all one-to-one comparisons, H would get a majority of the votes. Here, majority means at least 50% +1 of all votes cast.
• Comparing H with R, we see that H got 51 votes (48 from the second column and 3 from the third) versus 49 for R.
• Comparing H with C, we have that H had 97 votes with only 3 from C.
• Finally, H is preferred to both O and S by all voters.
It can be seen that in this example of a ranked voting method, the plurality method failed to satisfy a basic principle of fairness called the Condorcet criterion, which states that “If there is a candidate who wins in a one-to-one comparison with any other alternative, that candidate should be the winner of the election.”
This means the plurality method is not always the best option for a voting method. In cases such as the sample, proportional representation systems that make use of methods such as the ranked or preferential method and the range or score method may prove to be a better alternative for plurality and majority systems.
However, it should be noted though that in Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (1952), he states that “it is impossible to design a voting system that would simultaneously obey in all voting instances all of the following fairness conditions: monotonicity, independence of irrelevant alternatives, unanimity, and non-dictatorship.”
In short, the weakness of any ranked voting method is that it will also be unfair one way or another, and that Arrow’s theorem clarifies that there is actually no ideal voting system.
Fairness aside though, ranked methods may still work for the benefit of the elections in UPIS. Adopting the use of preference schedules, such as the table above, in the school for example is a good practice for being more transparent and holistic when it comes to voting. It also removes the dichotomy between the choices of the voters since they base off their decisions from their candidate preferences, meaning the order of choices from the voters will be much clearer instead of comparing first-choice candidates only.
With this, it can be concluded that even though the school’s current electoral system may be functional for the administration of the elections, engaging in a different one such as a ranked system may also improve the consolidation process of UPIS and its COMELEC. If these methods are given more time to be studied and tested, then it will also result in the fortification of democracy in the school.
Better yet, it may also be studied and applied in the national scale for the same reason. Since the national level rarely faces uncontested elections or even elections with only two candidates as opposed to UPIS, integrating proportional representation as a system may work better for the government. This, however, is another debate entirely for another day in the name of our democracy as a free people. //by Aldric de Ocampo
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